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When Felix Frankfurter evaluated the prospects for administrative gov-
ernment in these pages in the 1938 predecessor to this Symposium, he
observed that "[s]cience and technology cannot reshape society while law
maintains its Blackstonian essences." 1 For Frankfurter, the passing of the
Blackstonian era was marked by a change in institutional roles: Govern-
ment's growing concern with the quality of people's lives led to a stream
of public law that would largely flow, not from the legislature and the
courts, but from a burgeoning administrative structure.2
As Frankfurter foresaw, an administrative state with extensive regula-
tory powers emerged from the New Deal. But with respect to science and
technology, the administrative state has responsibilities far broader than
Roosevelt-era reformers envisioned. In maintaining air and water quality,
and assuring the safety of drugs, nuclear reactors, and workplaces, gov-
ernment no longer plays only a regulatory role. Administrators, legisla-
tors, and judges are asked to analyze and shape the scientific and techno-
logical future.
This expansion of government's responsibilities has important implica-
tions for environmental decisionmaking. Part I of this Article argues that
the use of sophisticated mathematical and biological models distinguishes
modern administrative experts from their Roosevelt-era predecessors.
These models distance a modern agency's reasoning from ordinary experi-
ence and insulate regulatory decisions from generalist review. Appellate
courts have responded by broadening the scope of judicial review. How-
ever, this response threatens the viability of the traditional model of ad-
ministrative law, which is based on the assumption that courts will defer
to agencies in matters of substance. The simplest reply to this threat is to
t Senior Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This work was supported in
part by the Center for Energy Policy Research of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory.
1. Frankfurter, Foreword, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 515 (1938). I respond here to Frankfurter's vision
of a creative legal system evolving in response to technological change. His emphasis was very differ-
ent from mine. Frankfurter's discussion centers on the nature, role, and recognition of administrative
law, see id. at 517-natural concerns in an era in which conservative critiques of the administrative
state retained a powerful hold on legal thought. See id. at 517-18.
2. Id. at 518-18a.
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separate technology from law by entrusting complex technical issues to
special institutions, leaving the relationship between courts and agencies
unchanged. Part II argues that this strategy-however promising in the-
ory-cannot succeed, given the intertwined roles of technical judgments
and ethical choices in formulating the standards of proof central to envi-
ronmental decisions. Part III examines the thesis that the traditional
model of administrative law can be preserved provided the courts give spe-
cial deference to regulatory fact-finding on the frontiers of science and
technology. Using as examples the most recent stages of the Vermont
Yankee litigation, it argues that this super-deferential approach neither
contributes to the balance among institutions necessary for a vital admin-
istrative process, nor encourages the reasoned decisionmaking essential to
the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. Part IV explores pos-
sibilities for institutional redesign and concludes with three proposals
designed to incorporate science and technology more deeply into
decisionmaking.
I.
The designers of the modern administrative state justified the expansion
of regulatory power as a necessary response to the growing complexity of
society.3 New Deal reformers were concerned primarily with economic
complexity, not with science and technology. Yet their approach to eco-
nomic regulation set a pattern for the technological future. In particular,
reformers sought to promote social and economic welfare through "ex-
pert" decisionmaking.' They argued that if legislative policies are to be
carried out fully, administrative experts must be free of constraints im-
posed by judges and other non-expert political appointees.5
Following unsuccessful efforts to persuade the courts that the adminis-
trative state was constitutionally illegitimate, conservatives, believing that
agency experts were partisan advocates whose decisions escaped indepen-
dent checks, demanded more active judicial oversight of regulatory deci-
3. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 68, 126 (1938); Cooper, Administrative
Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE L.J. 577, 580-81, 597, 599 (1938); Frankfurter, supra
note 1, at 518a-18b (quoting Hughes, Some Aspects of Development of American Law, 39 REP. N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N 266, 269 (1916)); Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative
Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538, 546 (1938); Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An
Experiment in Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 622, 622 (1938).
4. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 595; c. Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion,
22 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 275, 277 (1928) (administration by technical experts "bridge[s] the gap be-
tween popular government and scientific government"). Justice Brandeis is often credited with the
earliest definitive statement of the advantages of expertise. See Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator
Co., 259 U.S. 285, 292 (1922) (Brandeis, J.).
5. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 599-600.
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sions.1 New Deal proponents responded by pointing to the traditional
functional distinctions between fact and law. They argued that judicial
review should, as far as practicable, be limited to legal matters, and that
the respective areas of competence of judges, legislators, and administra-
tors should define the boundaries between law and fact.7 The result was a
political compromise:8 the crystallization in statutory form of the tradi-
tional model of administrative law9 in which the legislature maps the
boundaries of regulatory authority; agencies act, with a Marshallian
filling-in of details;' 0 and reviewing courts keep administrative power
within statutory limits."' Thus was laid the groundwork for the modern
approach to environmental decisions in which agencies oversee industrial
activities and assign the associated physical, biological, and statistical
problems to experts, implicitly or explicitly assuming that these problems
are separable from the larger legal, political, and ethical considerations
traditionally reserved for policymakers.
The assumptions underlying the New Deal compromise no longer hold.
The earlier controversies over ratesetting and valuation posed subtle and
difficult questions, as examination of the judicial record-even at the rari-
fled appellate level-attests. 2 But the modern era adds something more:
the incorporation into political life of sophisticated quantitative methods
for predicting the outcomes of social decisions. The expertise of the New
Deal thus differs fundamentally from the expertise now associated with
6. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 24 A.B.A.J. 331, 344-45
(1939) (decrying partisan experts); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT
WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 39-40 (1937) (Brownlow report) (characterizing agencies as "miniature ad-
ministrative governments"). See generally Verkuill The Emerging Concept of Administrative Proce-
dure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 268-78 (1978) (describing conservatives' shift from substantive opposi-
tion to New Deal legislation to demands for thoroughgoing judicial control of administrative actions).
7. J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 152.
8. Justice Jackson, a Roosevelt appointee, recognized the political compromise, see Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950) (Jackson, J.), and its far-reaching implications for the
nature and power of the administrative state, see FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-89 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
9. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1671-76 (1975).
10. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 15-16, 42 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.); see also
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (attempting to limit delegation of powers, but
noting national "legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details
with which [Congress] cannot deal directly"); Cooper, supra note 3, at 581-83 (Congress not compe-
tent to define fully complex regulatory standards for labor-industry relations and securities markets);
id. at 587 (duty of administering general provisions of regulatory statutes inevitably was entrusted to
agencies "authorized to fill up the details of the statutes" and ascertain facts toward which statutes are
directed).
11. See, e.g., Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6, 27, 33
(1983); c. J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 25-26 (demand for expertise "naturally leads to. . . authori-
ties limited in their sphere of action to the new tasks that government may conclude to undertake").
12. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276
(1923); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 3-57 (1970); Lilienthal, Regulation of Public
Utilities During the Depression, 46 HARV. L. REV. 745, 745-55, 763-68 (1933).
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environmental decisions. The New Deal did not require agency analysts
to solve the partial differential equations governing the diffusion of pollu-
tants in air and water, to manipulate epidemiological data, or to investi-
gate the mutagenic effects of industrial chemicals. It called instead for
learning through practical experience about the operations of industry and
government.13 As James Landis put it, the crying need was for "men bred
to the facts.""'
Moreover, the statutes defining a modern agency's mission no longer
map the boundaries of real institutional authority.15 Modern environmen-
tal statutes are diffuse. They require regulators to predict and control the
full spectrum of unwanted side effects of industrial activities.1" These stat-
utes authorize agency participation in large-scale research and project de-
velopment;17 they require regulators to anticipate the environmental con-
sequences of major federal decisions.1 8 Roosevelt-era legislation had no
such scope. Quintessential New Deal agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) primarily had licensing and enforcement powers. The New Deal
13. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 579 (1965); J. LANDIS,
supra note 3, at 23-24, 155.
14. J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 155.
15. Nor has the New Deal's faith in technical expertise been vindicated. The passage in 1946 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 76-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version
codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)), formally ratified the compromise between New
Deal reformers and conservative opponents of administrative government. In the same year, Congress
established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the first federal agency authorized to engage in
research, development, and industrial production. There could have been no more stringent test of the
New Deal model than the one it underwent as the AEC developed its military and commercial pro-
grams. The Commission combined scientific, engineering, and managerial skills of the highest order.
Reactor development was pushed ahead and siting and safety decisions were made, often with mini-
mal impetus and direction from policy levels. See 1 R. HEWLETT & 0. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 227-54 (1969). Yet the Commission did not
achieve the success the New Deal had promised. Its arcane subject, the national security implications
of its actions, and the domestic political tensions of the postwar era led to a decisionmaking process
dominated by highly committed engineers and scientists and closed to effective review by outsiders.
When the results of that process were evaluated, in the era of commercial nuclear power, it was found
that the agency had failed to establish quality control in manufacturing, to train personnel adequately,
to promote "learning by doing," and generally to establish a safe and efficient nuclear power system.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 49-50,
70-71 (1979) (personnel training); id. at 44, 68 (quality control); 1 SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, NU-
CLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, THREE MILE ISLAND 89 (1980) (operator training) [hereinafter cited
as ROGOVIN REPORT]; 2 id. (pt. 1), at 44-50 (quality assurance).
16. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60 (1983) (industry-by-industry new source performance standards
under Clean Air Act); id. §§ 405-460 (industry-by-industry effluent standards under Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).
17. E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 3(b), 60 Stat. 755, 759 (1946),
(authorization for in-house research) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2052-2053 (1976)); id.
§ 4(c), 60 Stat. at 759 (exclusive ownership of production facilities) (current version codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2061(a) (1976)); id. § 5(a)(2), 60 Stat. at 760 (same for materials) (repealed by Act of Aug.
26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, § 4, 78 Stat. 603); id. § 6(a), 60 Stat. at 763 (authority for military
research and production) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2121(a) (1976)).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1976) (environmental impact statements).
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Congress did not instruct the NLRB to theorize about the behavior of
management or explore new phenomena in the labor market. Nor did it
ask the SEC to analyze the stochastic subtleties of speculative movements
in securities prices. Even the Federal Communications Commission, at the
cutting edge of technology, was limited in its responsibilities,' 9 with only
implicit statutory encouragement to involve itself in research20 and none
for direct involvement in development.
In sum, to assure air and water quality, the safety of complex systems,
workplace health and safety, and the reliability of food and drugs, the
modern agency must model ecological and economic systems, interpret and
evaluate scientific data, and forecast the future.2 In so doing, agencies
with a specified mission often take on responsibilities beyond those
19. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 201(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1070
(authorization to order provision of service by common carriers) (current version codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(a) (1976)); id. §§ 201(b), 205(a), 48 Stat. at 1072 (set and enforce "just and reasonable" rates);
id. § 213(b), 48 Stat. at 1074 (value and inventory carrier property); id. § 214(a), 48 Stat. at 1075
(license interstate service); id. § 309, 48 Stat. at 1085 (license radio stations).
20. Id. § 218, 48 Stat. at 1077 (authorizing FCC to inform itself of current technological develop-
ments); id. § 303(g), 48 Stat. at 1082 (instructing FCC to study new uses of radio transmission).
21. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346(a), (b) (1982) (authorizing
FDA Administrator to establish zero tolerance level for pesticide if scientific data do not justify greater
tolerance); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (occupational
exposure standards for toxic agents must take account of latest available scientific data, feasibility of
standards, and past experience); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(5)(C) (1982) (EPA registration of pesticide contingent on finding that its use will not have
unreasonable adverse environmental effects); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6903(5), 6922-6923 (1976) (defining "hazardous waste" as waste that may cause mortality
or pose potential hazard, and instructing EPA to regulate generation of such wastes when they are in
quantities sufficient to pose potential harm to human health); Safe Drinking Water Amendments of
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-l(c) (Supp. V 1981) (EPA instructed to submit report to Congress projecting
future demand for drinking water and describing in detail problems to be resolved to assure adequate
and dependable future supply); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a)(1)(A)(i), 2605(a)
(1982) (directing EPA to regulate and authorize direct testing of chemicals that may present unrea-
sonable risks to health); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2056, 2061 (1982) (CPSC
to regulate consumer products to prevent unreasonable risks and imminent hazards); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1976) (EPA to propose compre-
hensive water pollution control strategies); id. § 1254(a) (water quality studies); id. § 1254(g)(2)
(EPA Administrator instructed to forecast supply and demand of professionals needed to maintain
water quality); id. § 1258 (demonstration projects in Great Lakes); id. § 1317 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(EPA to evaluate ecotoxicity of water pollutants); id. § 1326 (1976) (thermal effluent limitations to be
based on anticipated ecological and environmental effects); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (establishing scientific review body charged with advising EPA
of probable effects of national ambient air quality standards); id. § 7411(f)(2)(B) (EPA to consider, in
determining priorities for promulgating air quality standards for major stationary sources, extent to
which pollution "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"); id. §
7521(a)(1) (same for risks from motor vehicle emissions); id. § 7620 (construction of models aiding the
prevention of air quality deterioration); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §
824j(a) (1982) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorized to order "wheeling" of electric
power transmission services upon predictions of improved energy conservation, energy efficiency, or
reliability of power systems).
Courts have noted that prediction plays a central role in environmental decisions. See, e.g., NRDC
v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 334-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prediction as to durability of automobile filter);




granted them by enabling legislation.22 This expansion of administrative
power is due, in part, to the success of the environmental movement.23 Yet
in leading us beyond the New Deal, environmentalists have shattered the
old political equilibrium. By shifting the center of gravity of the adminis-
trative state from the articulation of social and economic goals to concern
with the implications of new technology and scientific discovery,24 they
have encouraged the use of sophisticated techniques distant from ordinary
experience and blurred the boundaries of institutional authority, thereby
reopening the question of how to assure effective independent oversight of
technological decisions.
II.
If it were possible to separate the technical from the political, ethical,
and legal, the New Deal's assumptions and the use of expertise that those
assumptions entail might well go unquestioned. 5 For if such separation
22. Under the pressure of the systemic philosophy of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4332 (1976), the Interstate Commerce Commission has estimated the effects of
changes in freight rates on the volume of scrap metal recycling, see Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 300-02 (1975); the environmental
implications of the activities of the Office of Management and Budget have been challenged, see An-
drus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); the Department of Interior has been ordered to consider
possible nuclear power plant construction and changes in natural gas pricing before approving off-
shore oil exploration, see NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has considered the comparative health consequences and economics of
nuclear and fossil-fuel based electricity production, see In re Public Serv. Co., 7 N.R.C. 179, 187
(1978); In re Tennessee Valley Auth., 5 N.R.C. 92, 102-03 (1977).
23. The success of the environmental movement may be read as a reaction to the New Deal's faith
in expertise. In some respects, the reaction was extreme: Authors condemned whole technologies as
dangerous, see, e.g., P. BRODEUR, THE ZAPPING OF AMERICA (1977) (health risks of radiofrequency
and microwave radiation); H. CALDICOTT, NUCLEAR MADNESS (1978) (health risks of nuclear
power). Yet the pressure of debate proved helpful. It led to reconsideration of the prevailing view that
providing an adequate and reliable supply of electricity requires central power stations. See A. LOVINS
& L. LOVINS, BRITTLE POWER 214-34 (1982). It sensitized the country to the implications of an
unregulated cycle of chemical innovation, use, and disposal. And it led to the realization that in a
technological era, there are subtle and serious costs associated with a thoroughgoing dependence on
quantitative policy analysis. See B. COMMONER, THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 17, 85 (1979) (distortion
of Project Independence Energy System model during Carter Administration).
24. But c. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412, 1414 (1981)
(decrying congressional failure to shift attention from technological means for controlling air pollution
to environmental ends defined in human, nontechnocratic terms).
25. The following discussion parallels in some respects Professor McGarity's analysis of separa-
bility issues. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of
Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
Professor McGarity argues that it is not possible to separate objectively the scientific and technological
dimensions of regulatory questions raised by science, but not answerable using scientific methods, id.
at 732, an argument consistent with mine, see infra pp. 1306-12. Yet our functional prescriptions
differ sharply. McGarity favors a "result-oriented" jurisprudence in which agencies are given full
power to decide non-separable issues. Id. at 781. I seek a balance among agencies and courts, see infra
pp. 1320-23, and reject a model of special deference to regulatory decisions on the frontiers of science
and technology, see infra pp. 1322-23, 1332. In my view, Professor McGarity effectively argues for a
return to Landis' extra-deferential treatment of administrative decisions, rejecting Separability only to
reassert it at a functional level.
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were workable, environmental decisions could be made in a simple two-
step process. Scientists, engineers, or statisticians would first gather, com-
pile, and analyze data, and legislators or administrative policymakers
would then consider the first-stage results and come to ultimate findings.
This two-step model preserves the traditional functional relationships
within administrative law by creating special institutions that analyze con-
troversial technical questions and report their findings to policymakers.
The history of unsuccessful attempts to distinguish fact from law26 sug-
gests that separation may be an unattainable goal.2 7 Courts recognized
long ago that mixed questions of fact and law pose special problems for
the judicial system. " Three different solutions emerged. The first claims
that the behavior of courts provides a practical, if tautological, definition:
Legal questions are those that judges choose to determine.29 The second
takes the functional position that legal questions are those about which
courts possess expertise, and therefore makes the normative claim that re-
viewing courts should only decide procedural issues that lie within judges'
special competence."' The third solution is substantive: It takes "facts" to
26. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 592-94; c. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996,
999-1000 (N.D. Cal.) (three judge court) (inherent difficulty in applying fact-policy distinction to
welfare appeals leads to due process violation), afi'd sub nora. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924
(1973).
27. Three distinct lines of Non-Separatist argument can be distinguished:
(1) A belief in the need to strengthen the authority of the executive branch so as to enable better
management and more efficient settlement of technological disputes. Proposals for internal reform of
the federal administrative agencies regularly express this view. See, e.g., COMM'N ON LAW AND THE
ECONOMY, AM. BAR ASSOC., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 79-88 (1979); Cutler, Book
Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1982); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1414-17 (1975). See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 359-60
(1982) (describing proposals to give President power to reverse agency policy decisions).
(2) A belief that environmental disputes are best settled by informal negotiation, divorced from the
formal constraints of the adversary process and insulated from the implicit restrictions governing sci-
entific research. This view is prevalent in discussions of how to treat the unwanted side effects of
familiar technologies. Managing non-nuclear hazardous wastes and choosing sites for dams are typical
problems to which a negotiation approach has been applied. See L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVI-
RONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (forthcoming).
(3) A belief that existing institutions and institutional relationships should be redesigned to en-
courage greater cooperation among the legal and scientific communities. See Markey, Law and Sci-
ence-Equal but Separate, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 619, 621-22 (1983). This view is usually ex-
pressed in environmental controversies involving advanced technologies, such as nuclear power and air
pollution control.
The crucial distinction among Non-Separatists is the degree of belief they profess in the logical
progression from the proposition that most environmental issues are Non-Separable, to the proposition
that in practice all environmental controversies turn on "policy" questions, to the conclusion that
science, and by implication, rational analysis itself, have little to contribute to the resolution of envi-
ronmental problems. I reject this logic as a celebration of ignorance. Yet its importance as a factor in
public debate cannot be denied. See Carter, Separatism and Skepticism, 92 YALE L.J. 1334, 1339-41
(1983).
28. See ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912).
29. See L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 279 (1930).
30. "Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a belief in their ...
expertness with regard to such questions. It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of
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be natural phenomena that can be described without any knowledge of
law, 1 and it calls upon a reviewing court to assure itself that the decision
under scrutiny is the result of reasoning from evidence, rather than the
mere exercise of personal will.2 That the functional prescriptions these
solutions entail are so different, and their reconciliation empirically so dif-
ficult, 3 underlines the refractory character of the problem of separating
fact from law.
Nonetheless, advocates of "science courts"-institutions specifically
designed to deal with factual technical issues-adopt a hybrid of the sec-
ond and third approaches. They believe that it is possible to separate, on
analytic grounds, pure scientific and engineering judgments from political,
normative, and legal judgments34 that can competently be made by ap-
pointed and elected officials. They further believe that Separation de-
mands the creation of special fact-finding and fact-interpreting institu-
tions.3 5 William Ruckelshaus, the Administrator of the Environmental
law emerges." J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 152.
31. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 548.
32. See id. at 596, 599 (discussing substantial evidence standard).
33. See, e.g., Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 904-05 (1943)
(no precise rule for distinguishing fact and law can be formulated, but there are general principles
that explain outcomes of specific cases). Compare J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
SUPREMACY OF LAW 55 (1927) (fact and law distinctions arbitrary) with Morris, Law and Fact, 55
HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (1942) (fact and law form distinct categories).
34. In the following discussion, the term "technical" denotes putative scientific and engineering
issues; the term "political" denotes putative legal, normative, and political issues.
35. E.g., Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SCIENTIST 505 (1975);
Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); Mazur, Science Courts, 15
MINERVA 1 (1977); Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Sci-
ence and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Science Court Task Force]; Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environ-
mental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973); Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking
Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443
(1979); see also Casper, Technology Policy and Democracy, 194 SCIENCE 29 (1976) (disputing value
of science court in broadly addressing technological controversies, but calling for use of public adver-
sary process to illuminate decisionmaking). But see Abrams & Berry, Mediation: A Better Alternative
to Science Courts, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1977, at 50 (proposing proceeding in which parties
and mediator publish a joint article that clarifies technological controversies by setting out the data,
the initial position of the parties, and their final positions, and specifies any changes in the parties'
positions or the formulation of the controversy induced by the process); Callen, The Science Court,
193 SCIENCE 950, 951 (1976) (science court proposals simplistic and dangerous: impossible to separate
facts from values in technological controversies); Commoner, A "Supreme Court" for Science?, 11
HOSP. PRACTICE 125 (1976) (establishment of science court undesirable because it would give advice
outside safeguards of peer review system and would institutionalize advisory system that lags behind
public in recognizing importance of environmental issues); Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values,
and Human Judgment, 194 SCIENCE 389, 391-93 (1976) (science court concept confuses results of a
scientific advetsary process with scientific judgments; preferable to use "person-oriented" approach in
which explicit social value judgments of elected officials are weighed and numerically combined with
explicit scientific judgments of experts to reach ultimate decisions); Lipson, Technical Issues and the
Adversary Process, 194 SCIENCE 890 (1976) (science court proposal overemphasizes truthfinding value
of adversary process; decisions would inherently be value-laden); Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscien-
tific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1978) (assumption that scientists' predictive judgments can be
separated from personal value choices gives unjustifiable aura of neutrality to proposed science court).
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Protection Agency (EPA), takes a similar Separatist position. He argues
for a sharp distinction between two different governmental functions:
"risk assessment," the objective, scientific activity that establishes the
probabilities and consequences of exposure to chemicals and radiation;
and "risk management," the core administrative activity, which should be
governed by a common statutory formula for weighing risks against bene-
fits in reaching regulatory decisions. 8 The importance of the issues and
the weight of opinion behind the Separability thesis suggest that the thesis
deserves both analytic and empirical tests. If the world is truly Separable,
it should be possible logically to distinguish the technical and legal dimen-
sions of environmental issues, and these distinctions should be manifest in
the actual performance of institutions.
The Separatist argument is threefold. First, Separatists assert that it
is possible, within the context of environmental controversies, to identify
certain issues as "scientific"87 and assign them to the appropriate non-
political institutions-if necessary creating institutions for that purpose.
Second, Separatists claim that this assignment is responsive to democratic
practices, in that once Separability has been achieved and purely technical
questions have been answered, policy questions can be resolved by prop-
erly elected or appointed officials.38 Third, Separatists argue that the ad-
vantages of open technological decisions can be enjoyed only in the context
36. See Ruckelshaus, Science, Risks and Public Policy, 221 SCIENCE 1026 (1983) (address to the
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.). Ruckelshaus responds to a recent report of a
panel of the National Research Council, see COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESS-
MENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT (1983) [hereinafter cited as RISK MGMT. REP.), that responds in turn to a con-
gressional inquiry whether "objective" risk assessment can be separated institutionally from "public
and social policy decisions." Id. at 140. The panel urges regulatory agencies to maintain a "clear
conceptual distinction" between risk assessment and risk management. Id. at 7. This suggests to
Ruckelshaus that policy considerations need not and should not enter risk assessment. See Ruckels-
haus, supra, at 1027-28 (if public suspects that policy considerations influence risk assessment, public
confidence in regulatory decisions erodes). The National Research Council panel does not, however,
argue that sharp conceptual distinctions between technical and political issues can be drawn. Rather,
under the panel's definitions of those terms, risk management and risk assessment cut across science
and policy. See RISK MGMT. REP., supra, at 33, 36-37, 48-49, 76-77, 142-43, 166-67.
Although the National Research Council panel and this Article share the view that technical and
nontechnical questions are not separable, there are important differences between the two approaches.
In general, the Report stresses functional-as distinct from substantive-separation of policy from
science, see RISK MGMT. REP., supra, at 153-54, while this Article fully accepts substantive Non-
Separability and calls for institutional innovations that encourage a controlled mixing of technical and
political roles, see infra pp. 1328-30.
37. Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 506-07; Martin, supra note 35, at 1064; Science Court Task
Force, supra note 35, at 654; cf. Mazur, supra note 35, at 11 (fact-value separation not fully possible;
science court can and should attempt to resolve only those statements falsifiable using empirical data).
38. Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 505 (unthinkable in democratic society that scientists would be
endowed with authority to assume full moral responsibility for science's social impact); Martin, supra
note 35, at 1064 (science court proposal allocates scientific questions to experts, policy questions to
public representatives); Science Court Task Force, supra note 35, at 653 (establishment of science
court will allow ultimate social value questions to be settled by government or directly by voters).
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of an adversary process.39
These arguments have undeniable force. If the technical can be distin-
guished in practice from the legal and ethical, the principles of democratic
government demand that Separation be enforced in order that properly
chosen public officials make the legal, political, and ethical decisions that
we have placed in their care. For if these distinctions go unenforced as
technological decisions proliferate, experts gradually will assume greater
roles in policymaking, boundaries of institutional authority will blur, and
participatory government will be threatened. In a Separatist world, a
powerful justification thus emerges for preserving the existing institutional
balance, while creating new institutions that provide the necessary techni-
cal expertise.
Yet before establishing such institutions, a serious examination of as-
sertedly separable issues is in order. It is true that there are scientific and
engineering problems whose answers are central to environmental deci-
sions and yet free of legal and ethical content. Given adequately specified
assumptions, solutions of the partial differential equations describing the
diffusion of air pollutants can be agreed upon, even when they bear upon
the form and application of rules and procedures under the Clean Air
Act-rules and procedures that affect almost every domestic industry. And
it is possible in principle to construct models that enable estimation, apart
from any ethical and legal considerations, of the atmospheric concentra-
tion of substances that can degrade the ozone layer or raise the global
mean surface temperature. But the difficult environmental cases that regu-
larly confront agencies and courts often turn on evidence of actual harm
that is not immediately compelling-evidence based upon complex models
whose validity cannot yet be tested directly; or upon statistical tests ap-
plied at the limits of detectability, in the absence of knowledge about the
biological mechanisms by which harm may be caused.40 Given the tenuous
39. Casper, supra note 35, at 32-33 (public adversary processes will: (1) allow technical experts to
present analyses of social and political implications of new technology in institutional framework that
does not presuppose experts' objectivity; (2) create genuine debate among experts, rather than en-
courage consensus of opinion; (3) create tradition of public dialogue that will combat secrecy and
make whistleblowing unnecessary); Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 507 (formal adversary process with
scientifically sophisticated advocates and judges will "optimize objectivity" and lead to judgments that
"forego . . . moral or political stands"); Martin, supra note 35, at 1074 (central purpose of science
court proposal is to employ adversary process to uncover truth); Science Court Task Force, supra note
35, at 653 (procedures modeled on formal legal adjudication will enable emergence of "defensible,
credible, technical bases for urgent policy decisions"). But see Sofaer, supra note 35, at 20-21 (adver-
sary system places great weight on personal and verbal abilities of advocates; therefore, it is ill-suited
to produce scientifically acceptable decisions).
40. Environmental decisions would be very different, though hardly easier if, for example, mecha-
nisms for carcinogenesis were fully understood. For if so, while the demand for assessments of risk of
the precise sort we now debate would gradually fade away, discussion would focus instead on whether
the causal notions inherent in traditional formulas for legal and ethical responsibilities are transfera-
ble to biomedical and engineering contexts in which probabilities play important roles.
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nature of the technical evidence and the uncertainties about how actual
injuries may occur, environmental controversies cannot be split into tech-
nical and legal parts. Environmental decisions then ultimately turn not on
the substance of scientific questions, but on the procedures by which the
significance of scientific evidence is evaluated-procedures integral,
though in quite different senses, both to the administrative process and to
scientific research.
Consider the hypothesis that workers exposed over many years to air-
borne benzene in concentrations of ten parts per million are twice as likely
to suffer from leukemia as persons in the general population."1 Separatists
would characterize this hypothesis as a "scientific" question properly ad-
dressed by a technical advisory body.' Specifying the dose-incidence rela-
tionship' 3 for leukemia at low levels of benzene exposure is not, however,
an ordinary scientific task. We do not yet know how leukemia is induced.
Therefore, to infer a relationship between chronic low-level benzene expo-
sure and leukemia is to make an assertion about statistical correlations,
rather than biological mechanisms. Moreover, although statistical studies
suggest that exposure to high concentrations of benzene, perhaps in com-
bination with other factors, is associated with a significantly increased risk
of leukemia,"' there are no precise incidence data at exposures as low as
ten parts per million.' 5 The hypothesis that low-dose exposure to benzene
significantly increases the risk of leukemia is therefore settled for regula-
tory purposes by weighing fragmentary, uncertain, and often contradictory
pieces of epidemiological evidence bearing upon the occurrence of leuke-
mia in small numbers of workers."'
That this evidence is far from perfect does not vitiate the usefulness of
detailed analysis. Experts can develop, perform, and analyze epidemiolog-
ical surveys and animal experiments bearing upon toxicity. Given data
from these surveys and experiments, they can formulate statistical tests
and in principle control the "Type I" error of rejecting the hypothesis that
41. Cf Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion) (Benzene) (invalidating OSHA's proposed reduction of benzene exposure standard from 10 parts
per million to 1 part per million); see id. at 618 n.9 (first large-scale epidemiological study of benzene
and leukemia found twofold increase in leukemia rate of exposed workers over rate in general
population).
42. See Martin, supra note 35, at 1079; Mazur, supra note 35, at 10-11. But see McGarity,
supra note 25, at 749-50 (to interpret cancer-related agency policy decisions as pure factual findings
puts intolerable strain on traditional Separatist model of court-agency relationship).
43. The dose-incidence relations referred to here specify the percentage of an exposed population
expected to suffer disease, given a specified exposure level.
44. See, e.g., COMM. ON TOXICOLOGY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, HEALTH EFFECTS OF BENZENE 9-15 (1976).
45. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 699-702 & nn.23-24
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. See 448 U.S. at 618 n.9, 619-20 n.12 (plurality opinion).
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"substance X leads to disease D at concentration Y with probability P"
when this hypothesis is true, or the "Type II" error of accepting this
hypothesis when false.' 7 But in this process, a central question is not ad-
dressed: How should one specify the sizes of the environmental mistakes
society is willing to tolerate? That this question remains makes clear that
standards of proof for evaluating the results of statistical tests or extrapo-
lations from animal experiments' 8  are critical to environmental
decisions.' 9
Setting a standard of proof is at once a device for controlling error and
for assuring fairness.50 It requires, for example, an assessment of the seri-
ousness of the risk in question.5 1 We regret any large-scale damage to
public health or the environment. But it is nevertheless true that we are
more willing to tolerate the risk of an error that causes the extinction of
snail darters or bowhead whales than one that endangers human lives.5
This distinction will be reflected in different standards of proof for evalu-
ating proposals to lease offshore lands for oil exploration and for approv-
ing new food additives.53
Setting a standard of proof requires, moreover, an appreciation of the
difficulties of reaching definitive risk estimates. For example, a standard
of proof that calls for unrealistically small "Type I" and "Type II" errors
47. See, e.g., P. BICKEL & K. DOKSUM, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 163-71 (1977); H. CRAMER,
MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF STATISTICS 527-28 (1946).
48. For a recent attempt to set out a general theory on which such standards could be based, see
DuMouchel & Harris, Bayes Methods for Combining the Results of Cancer Studies in Humans and
Other Species, 78 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N 293 (1983).
49. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 652 (1980) (plurality
opinion); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 107 & n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1978); International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Leventhal, Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 536 (1974).
51. In more traditional terms, formulation of a standard of proof demands sensitivity to the rela-
tive importance of the interests at stake. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (liberty interest requires proof of criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (standard of proof
must take into account nature and consequences of risks of error); Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden
of Proofand Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. REV. 914, 919 (1966) (when administrative action would
result in serious consequences for individuals, justice may be served by increased procedural
protections).
52. Although protection of the snail darter under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1982), delayed the Tellico Dam project, see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Con-
gress later exempted the project from the Act, see Energy & Water Development Appropriation Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979), and the dam is now complete.
53. Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (em-
phasizing statutory and precedential support for less stringent standard of proof in administrative
decision to prohibit commercial use of suspect carcinogen) with Houck, The "Institutionalization of
Caution" Under § 7 of the Endangered Species Act: What Do You Do When You Don't Know?, 12
ENVTL. L. REP. 15,001, 15,001 & n.4 (1982) (pointing out that under standards of Endangered
Species Act for weighing evidence of threats to species survival, of 4500 consultations under the Act
conducted from 1973 to 1978, only three led to litigation, and all three projects subsequently were
completed).
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of 0.1% in setting a maximum occupational exposure of ten parts per mil-
lion of benzene in air is no standard at all. It will be ignored in practice,
to be replaced by other implicit rules that make regulatory decisions eas-
ier. Moreover, a standard of proof cannot reasonably be set without an
appreciation of its consequences for the perceived fairness of the decision-
making process. However carefully formulated, the hypothetical standard
that accepts a greater margin for the error of incorrectly concluding that a
substance poses negligible occupational risks when the workers at risk are
poor and uneducated raises serious questions about the integrity of the
resulting decisions. In sum, no one sensitive to the full implications of the
endeavor can set a standard of proof for determining the riskiness of
human exposure to a hazardous substance while neglecting either political
or technical considerations. In that sense, setting a standard of proof is a
non-Separable task.
54
One might suppose that there are common objectives in the weighing of
evidence for pure scientific purposes and for regulatory purposes. In turn,
these commonalities-allowing for the technical problems of adapting sci-
entific language to a regulatory context-might assure that expert bodies
can make judgments that are both scientifically defensible and useful in
practical regulation. But this argument fails to confront important func-
tional distinctions between scientific and legal evidence. Scientific evidence
principally serves to define the limits of knowledge and help set directions
for further work. Observing the remnants of the primordial universe,
proving an outstanding conjecture in computation theory, or discovering
the functions of a retrovirus, may provide spectacular confirmation of the
vitality of science, enrich the researchers, or cure the sick. But these are
not scientific concerns. The integrity of each scientific community depends
on the limited use of the results of discovery to illuminate the intellectual
future. Once the process of weighing evidence is set in the context of a
societal decision, however, the direct impact of the evaluation does not fall
only on the scientific community. Claims of right or of compensation for
injury must then be addressed, and these evoke larger purposes: the objec-
tives of protecting individual rights, assuring fairness, and preserving the
integrity of the legal system. The same normative arguments that underlie
Separatist theory tell us that these are not questions to which technical
experts qua experts ought to speak.
Actual experience in resolving environmental controversies demon-
strates that however attractive Separability is in theory, it has not been
achieved in fact. Experts have not been restricted to technical matters, nor
have generalist decisionmakers restricted themselves to legal and norma-
54. See McGarity, supra note 25, at 748-49.
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tive issues. Consider the widely followed decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,55
in which environmental groups and local, state, and federal agencies chal-
lenged the dumping of tailings from iron mining into Lake Superior. The
plaintiffs argued that a low, though measurable, concentration of as-
bestiform fibers in local drinking water-contamination presumably re-
sulting from the Reserve Mining Company's operations"'-endangered
the citizens of Duluth, Minnesota.
Under a Separatist model, the standard of proof that such a risk has
legal significance is set by statute, or failing that, by a court.5 Moreover,
in a Separatist world, judges do not make technical findings. In Reserve
Mining, however, these limits were not respected. The federal district
court retained its own expert medical witness to help it understand the
evidence. Separatist theory notwithstanding, the court's expert formulated
a standard of proof with immediate legal implications. In evaluating the
risks to Duluth residents, he distinguished between "medical" and "scien-
tific" proof.58 He argued that scientific conclusions recognized as truth
must meet numerical standards that are generally high,59 and that proof
of a medical risk requires a less stringent standard, based, as he put it,
upon erring "on the side of what is best for the greatest number.""0 The
court of appeals accepted this argument, concluding that the asbestos con-
taminant "gives rise to a reasonable medical concern," "creates some
health risk," and should be removed."1 The Reserve Mining court did not
confine itself to logical inferences based upon legal arguments. Addressing
a dose-incidence problem similar to the one faced in Industrial Union De-
partment v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene),"2 the Eighth Circuit
held that there was no "scientific or medical basis" to conclude that the
residents of Duluth "experience[d] an excess rate of cancer attributable to
Reserve's discharge."63
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,"4 which upheld regulations requiring a phaseout
of lead additives in gasoline, provides another example of an excursion by
a federal court of appeals into a technical universe. The arguments that
people are harmed by exposure to airborne lead rely in part upon bio-
55. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
56. Id. at 514-19.
57. See Martin, supra note 35, at 1064.
58. 514 F.2d at 519.
59. Id. The expert noted the practice of seeking 95-99% confidence levels in statistical studies
before claiming definitive results. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 520.
62. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion); see supra p. 1310.
63. 514 F.2d at 517 n.50.
64. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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chemistry.6 However, as in Reserve Mining, more persuasive than the
biochemical evidence for the Ethyl court and the EPA was a body of epi-
demiological evidence bearing upon the health effects of lead at air con-
centrations commonly found in modern urban environments-levels much
lower than those at which the classic symptoms of lead poisoning are
observed.66
The epidemiological evidence of harm was ambiguous. A major study of
blood lead levels in seven major cities found no demonstrable association
between atmospheric lead levels presumably resulting from gasoline com-
bustion and average lead levels in the blood of local residents.67 The EPA
nevertheless decided to order the phaseout of the additives. In the agency's
view, the lack of demonstrable environmental correlations in the seven cit-
ies study was outweighed by positive correlations detected in other stud-
ies.6 The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's position, 9 concluding that the
agency had reasonably preferred the results of studies showing non-zero
effects of low-level atmospheric lead, particularly in children living in city
centers. 0 In situations with high uncertainty, said the court, the error of
finding zero effect when an effect does exist is more probable than the
error of labeling a harmless substance as toxic.71
Furthermore, as in Reserve Mining, the Ethyl majority reached its own
conclusions regarding issues that would be viewed as technical in a Sepa-
rable world. By applying empirical data on blood lead levels following
exposure to airborne lead, the court found that lead emissions in the at-
mosphere due to gasoline combustion "can make a significant contribution
to blood lead levels" in the general population. 2 The court criticized the
lack of controls on climatic conditions in epidemiological studies.73 It also
reached its own judgment on the relative weight that should be accorded
to the various epidemiologic and clinical studies.
74
Ethyl's conclusion regarding the relative significance of positive and
negative epidemiological evidence turns in effect not only on the court's
65. See J. HARRIS & R. KELLERMEYER, THE RED CELL 35-43 (rev. ed. 1970).
66. At the time Ethyl was decided, typical mean urban atmospheric lead levels were roughly 500
times lower than levels at which lead poisoning becomes clinically apparent. COMM. ON BIOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LEAD: AIRBORNE LEAD
IN PERSPECTIVE 21-22, 74 (1972).
67. Tepper & Levin, A Survey of Air and Population Lead Levels in Selected American Commu-
nities, reproduced in Jt. App. at 840, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). The Tepper and Levin study was jointly sponsored by EPA and the
petroleum, lead, and zinc industries, see Jt. App. at 841, Ethyl.
68. See Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 57-61 (App. A).
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id. at 40, 43-46.
71. Id. at 41 (citing D. CLARK & B. MACMAHON, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 100 (1967)).
72. Id. at 55.
73. Id. at 57 n.4.
74. Id. at 59, 63.
1314
Vol. 92: 1300, 1983
Environmental Decisionmaking
specification of the relative sizes of Type I and Type II errors, 75 but also
on a general characterization of the ratio of correct to incorrect results in a
particular field of research. A generalization of that kind carries the court
well beyond the boundaries of judicial authority envisioned in Separatist
theory. Such an exegesis can be justified only by reference to the details of
the underlying biology and the relevant epidemiologic practices. More-
over, the court's critique and evaluation of the epidemiologic and clinical
evidence directly answers the assertedly Separable dose-incidence
question."6
In exploring technical issues in depth, Ethyl and Reserve Mining are
not unique. In Texas v. EPA, a Fifth Circuit panel examined the details
of a model of regional distribution of air pollutants central to Texas' State
Implementation Plan under the Clean Air Act. The panel made purely
technical inferences;7" in particular, it recalculated the figures that sup-
ported the state's estimates of regional photochemical oxidant concentra-
tions. 7 9 Similarly, in Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy
Commission," the D.C. Circuit considered in detail an environmental
group's attacks on the computer model used by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) in determining the effectiveness of emergency core cooling
systems (ECCSs) for commercial nuclear reactors" and on the AEC's
characterization of the largest feasible reactor accident against which the
ECCS must guard. 2 Recognizing the unusual technical aspects of the
case,8" the court considered methodological distinctions that emerged from
the AEC's computer simulations 4 and attempted to reconcile the safety
goals incorporated in the Commission's reactor siting policy with the acci-
dent categorization incorporated in the ECCS acceptance criteria.8 5 In In-
ternational Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,6 Judge Leventhal, over the
Separatist objections of Judge Bazelon, 7 analyzed in detail the results of
tests of the effectiveness of catalytic converters for motor vehicle exhaust
systems.88 His discussion makes clear that the technical and legal aspects
75. See supra pp. 1310-11.
76. See supra pp. 1310, 1313.
77. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976).
78. See id. at 301 (Texas' reduction model for photochemical oxidants asserted to apply to
nonreactive hydrocarbons, yet explicitly based on data for non-methane hydrocarbons).
79. Id. at 310-11 & n.39.
80. 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
81. See id. at 1086-89.
82. Id. at 1089.
83. Id. at 1094.
84. See id. at 1089 (discussing AEC's distinction between analytic techniques and computational
methods).
85. See id. at 1087, 1089-90.
86. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Id. at 651 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in result).
88. Id. at 630, 648 (Leventhal, J.).
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of the analysis intertwine.8 9 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. NRC (Vermont Yankee III),9" Judge Bazelon, eschewing his Separatist
procedural approach,91 examined in detail the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission's (NRC's) evaluation of the risks of geologic disposal of nuclear
wastes and found the Commission's treatment of the uncertainties in these
risks deficient.9"
This discussion does not suggest that the federal courts have acted im-
properly in reviewing environmental decisions. While the cases discussed
above display unusual functional relationships among courts, agencies,
and experts, they do not conflict with accepted judicial practices. Judges
may properly reach a considered judgment that a court should, even un-
aided, take the inferential leap from scientific argument to legal concep-
tion.9 These cases illustrate instead the evolutionary process by which
science is gradually and haltingly assimilated into law . 4 They demon-
strate that the distinction between scientific and legal issues is arbitrary
and unworkable. The questions raised are deeper than whether useful dis-
tinctions can be drawn between technical and legal matters. Rather, as in
the New Deal era, the modern environmental controversy challenges us to
shape the changing roles of institutions.
89. Cf. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (D.D.C. 1981)
(where Congress has not directed, court will not substitute its views on environmental controversy in
which subjective value judgments intertwine with scientific data).
90. 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct.
2246 (1983).
91. Compare 685 F.2d at 478-81 (Bazelon, J.) (finding NRC zero-risk conclusion represents
"self-evident error in judgment") and id. at 481-86 (holding zero-risk conclusion improperly excludes
uncertain environmental costs of nuclear waste disposal from consideration in individual reactor li-
censing) with International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in result) (denying legality and utility of judicial exploration of technical
intricacies of agency decisions and urging instead judicial establishment of procedural guidelines).
92. See 685 F.2d at 478-86.
93. See Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 1080, 1100 (1966); c.
L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 613 ("areas of expertness . . . are inextricably woven into the whole
fabric of judgment").
94. The tentative nature of the process is perhaps clearest in criminal law. Compare United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (voiceprint evidence admissible) with United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) (voiceprint evidence inadmissible) and United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same). Administrative law provides similar evidence of
evolutionary change. For example, as knowledge increases, different standards of proof may become
applicable to the same agency action. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 301 n.16 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976); see also Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1187-91
(1975) (contrasting traditional Blackstonian model of information flow to court with informal flow to
Supreme Court in actual cases). For discussions of the assimilation process, see Gellhorn, The Law's
Demand for Both Stability and Change: The Legislative and Administrative Response, 17 VAND. L.
REV. 91 (1963); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence. Frye v. United States, a




The failure of forms of Separability based either upon a substantive
distinction between fact and law, or upon a normative restriction on the
scope of judicial review, threatens the traditional structure of administra-
tive law. Yet this structure may be preserved in other ways. An alternative
model builds in a different way upon the functional and normative dis-
tinctions between fact-finding and lawmaking.9 5 This model gives a spe-
cial interpretation to agency predictions based upon evidence on the fron-
tiers of science and technology. It views these predictions as policy
judgments relatively insulated from judicial oversight.98 In addition to
their "ordinary" legal and factual dimensions, environmental decisions are
taken in this alternative to have a characteristic core involving uncertain
scientific evidence and specification of the maximum risks society will tol-
erate. 97 Under the model, the responsibility for dealing with this core is
assigned solely to administrative policymakers.
The deferential approach to "quasi-legislative" policymaking reflects
historical practice98 and is widely followed. In principle, it enables the
flexible response to scientific and technological change that Frankfurter
envisioned. '00 For as discovery and innovation proceed, the model of def-
erence to administrative predictions can adjust the boundary between "or-
dinary" fact-finding and "quasi-legislative" judgment and thereby alter
the functional relationships among institutions. Whether such a dynamic
approach will succeed is an open question. It remains to be seen whether
as agencies grow more sophisticated in facing reviewing courts, they defeat
95. See J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 152.
96. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2256, 4682 (1983) (Vermont
Yankee IV) (zero-release assumption for nuclear waste depositories within Commission's discretion);
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83-84 & n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (deferring to
EPA's decision to regulate "less chlorinated" PCBs); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467, 474-75 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (determination of tolerable level of asbestos dust left to
Secretary).
97. See Comment, Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 148, 161 (1977).
98. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935) (denying Pres-
ident's power to remove FTC commissioner, on grounds that Commission acts as quasi-legislative
body); Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (upholding ratemak-
ing decision of state commission as legislative act).
99. Indeed, the Court has effectively elevated the deference model to a higher status, forbidding as
a violation of the bicameral and presentation requirements, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3, Congress'
attempts to manage its delegation of authority in a complex society through the use of a veto power
over administrative actions. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2804 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
Chadha may well contribute to the ever-enlarging sphere of executive autonomy. Yet in an era in
which agency regulations have been given the formal imprimatur of legislation, see Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981), and high technology tends to isolate agency decisions from
review, see infra pp. 1325-26, restoring the balance of power among institutions is an objective that
deserves first priority.
100. See supra p. 1300.
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the adaptive process, increasing their discretionary powers by drawing
more of the real substance of decisions into a realm that plausibly can be
described as the scientific and technological frontier. 1
The recent stages of the phoenix-like Vermont Yankee litigation 0 2 pro-
vide some insight into the desirability of special judicial deference to
agency predictions. The facts merit a brief review. 03 In the military phase
of the atomic energy program, experts recognized that, as a result of their
toxicity, reactor wastes demand special disposal measures. 04 Yet no dispo-
sal technology was created. Nor did Congress give the AEC, or later the
commercial nuclear industry, incentives to find solutions to the waste
problem.10 5 In 1972, the AEC instituted a generic rulemaking0 6 to decide
how its boards hearing individual reactor licensing proceedings should
treat the storage and disposal of spent fuel. On the basis of this rulemak-
ing, the NRC, which assumed the AEC's regulatory responsibilities dur-
ing the fuel cycle hearings,"' concluded that burial of high-level and
transuranic wastes would not result in the release of toxic materials. The
Commission summarized its conclusions in a table showing the NRC
staff's numerical estimates of the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel
cycle.108 This table omits, however, any estimate of the leakage of toxic
101. One commentator anticipates this shift in response to any review process that insulates an
area of expertise from external oversight. See McGarity, supra note 25, at 750; see also New York v.
United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Unless we make the requirements
for administrative actions strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can
become a monster ...with no practical limits on its discretion."), cited with approval in Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869 (1983); Wuillamey v.
Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237, 241 (D.N.J. 1973) (technical expertise needed to reach air quality find-
ing renders agency decision unassailable in a court).
More generally, several commentators have called attention to the increasing complexity of environ-
mental litigation, caused by the growing sophistication of the major actors. See Rabin, Lawyers for
Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 240-41 (1976); Yellin,
High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 553 n.386 (1981).
102. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (Vermont Yankee I), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yankee II), on remand, NRDC v. NRC, 685 F.2d
459 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Vermont Yankee III), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,
103 S.Ct. 2246 (1983) (Vermont Yankee IV).
103. For a more extensive view of the substantive issues, see Yellin, supra note 101, at 531-49.
For discussions of the procedural aspects of Vermont Yankee I and Vermont Yankee II, see Byse,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
104. See, e.g., U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, REPORT WASH-88: PROCEEDINGS OF THE REAC-
TOR SAFEGUARD COMMITTEE 34 (1948) (summarizing meetings of June 14-16, 1948).
105. Cf M. WILRICH & R. LESTER, RADIOACTIVE WASTE 121 (1977) (noting lack of comprehen-
sive plans for regulating nuclear wastes and for long-term waste management).
106. Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle No. RM.-50-3 (AEC 1972-74) (first
phase of fuel cycle rulemaking).
107. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879, 5891 (Supp. V 1981).
108. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,191 (1974) (table S-3).
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wastes from permanent disposal facilities. Hearing boards considering re-
actor licensing applications therefore did not take into account in their
cost-benefit balancing the uncertain environmental costs associated with
the development and subsequent operation of geologic nuclear waste
repositories. °10
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. NRC (Ver-
mont Yankee I),'1o environmental groups successfully challenged the fuel
cycle rule. Judge Bazelon, writing for the D.C. Circuit, set aside and re-
manded the Commission's licensing decisions on mixed procedural and
substantive grounds."1 The Supreme Court reversed in a strongly worded
unanimous opinion.112 The Court read the lower court's decision as an
improper attempt to restructure the agency's internal decisionmaking pro-
cedures,"' but left the door open for further judicial review of the ade-
quacy of the administrative record. 14 In the third phase of Vermont Yan-
kee," 5 the NRC had once again promulgated a fuel cycle rule.," Again
the NRDC challenged its validity. And again the D.C. Circuit, speaking
through Judge Bazelon, invalidated the Commission's action, 17 this time
on explicitly substantive grounds. Most recently, in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. NRDC (Vermont Yankee IV),"'8 the Supreme Court
again reversed the court of appeals.
Judge Bazelon's approach in Vermont Yankee III directly conflicts
with the model of deference to quasi-legislative predictions. After scruti-
nizing the substance of the agency's decision, he concluded that the NRC's
zero-risk finding was a "self-evident" error 1 9 in light of considerable evi-
dence of uncertainties in the long-term environmental consequences of the
burial of nuclear wastes. Judge Bazelon characterized as equally unsatis-
109. See 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,369 (1979).
110. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yankee II).
111. 547 F.2d at 643, 645, 653-54.
112. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yankee
11). Justices Blackmun and Powell did not participate.
113. See id. at 539-41 (interpreting Vermont Yankee I as turning on "perceived inadequacies of
the procedures employed in the rulemaking" rather than on deficiencies in the AEC record).
114. See id. at 535-36 n.14.
115. NRC v. NRDC, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Vermont Yankee III), rev'd sub nom.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983) (Vermont Yankee IV).
116. The Commission reiterated its zero-release finding following Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yankee 11):
[Flor the limited purpose of the fuel cycle rule it is reasonable to base impacts on the assump-
tion which the Commission believes the probabilities favor, i.e., that bedded-salt repository
sites can be found which will provide effective isolation of radioactive waste from the
biosphere.
44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,369 (1979) (footnote omitted).
117. 685 F.2d at 494.
118. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
119. 685 F.2d at 481.
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factory the NRC's use of its zero-risk finding as a "decisionmaking de-
vice" that excluded consideration in licensing hearings of the uncertain
environmental costs of permanent disposal of nuclear wastes.120 Because
the agency admitted that although the environmental costs are small, fuel
cycle considerations might well swing otherwise close decisions against li-
censing,1" 1 Judge Bazelon concluded that forbidding consideration of fuel
cycle effects in reaching reactor licensing decisions amounted to an explicit
violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
122
On the other hand, Judge Wilkey, dissenting, fully adopted the defer-
ential model."2" He argued that the NRC evaluated evidence on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge, and that its prediction with respect to reposi-
tory performance is precisely that type of "legislative policymaking" that
deserves special deference. Judge Wilkey argued further that nuclear
waste disposal does not pose major risks, and that the NRC's decision to
remove the back end of the fuel cycle from consideration in individual
reactor licensing proceedings therefore represented a reasonable exercise
of discretion.1 2 In Vermont Yankee IV,' 25 a unanimous Supreme Court
followed Judge Wilkey's reasoning and upheld the NRC's action. The
Court characterized the Commission's approach as a reasonable one that
balanced optimism over future repository performance in containing solid
reactor wastes with cautious assumptions that all radioactive gases en-
trained in the wastes will escape before a repository is sealed.' 26 Explicitly
affirming the model of deference to quasi-legislative agency findings, the
Court reminded the lower court that the NRC's predictions lay "within
its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science," and that under




One does not come away from a reading of Vermont Yankee III and
Vermont Yankee IV with confidence in the usefulness of judicial deference
to quasi-legislative predictions. 28 Indeed, it is questionable whether the
120. Id. at 482-83.
121. Id. at 484.
122. Id.
123. 685 F.2d at 518 & n.14 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 538, 543.
125. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
126. Id. at 2255-56.
127. Id. at 2256.
128. Nor does the performance of the parties encourage optimism about the prospects of using the
traditional adversary process to resolve complex environmental disputes. As in earlier phases of this
litigation, see Yellin, supra note 101, at 546-48, the parties were not helpful to the courts. The
NRDC attacked the form of the Commission's finding, rather than its substance. See NRDC Re-
sponse to Court's Order of Aug. 13, 1980, at 2, Vermont Yankee III, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(treatment of uncertainties in NRC proceedings unexceptionable, but exposition of uncertainties in
final rule not sufficiently explicit). And the Commission confused the discussion by raising the possi-
bility that fuel cycle effects may tilt the ultimate cost-benefit balance against an individual reactor. See
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Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee IV fully understood the implications
of its application of the deference model for public acceptance of impor-
tant environmental decisions. First, the Court did not recognize that the
NRC's final rule did not directly address the public's concerns over nu-
clear waste. The Court declared itself impressed with the reasonableness
of the Commission's "risk-averse" environmental assessment of the ura-
nium fuel cycle.129 Yet the balance in the NRC's "balanced" view ignored
the long-term risks of repository leakage that are central to the nuclear
waste debate. Considering, as the Commission did, whether a small vol-
ume of radioactive gases will be released before a repository is sealed is
not the same as considering the possibility, however distant, that highly
toxic fission products and heavy elements will be released in large volume
into the biosphere over the millennia during which such wastes remain
hazardous for direct human exposure.13
Second, the Court failed to recognize that the Commission's zero-risk
finding does not provide basic information critical for defensible risk anal-
ysis. Exploration and understanding of uncertainty are essential to good
scientific research, to competent epidemiologic analysis, and to convincing
econometric and cost-benefit studies of the type now often central to regu-
latory decisions. In these fields, depth of insight is achieved through an
understanding of uncertainties and of their implications for further re-
search. While an agency's risk estimates cannot always be judged using
the standards of basic science, at a minimum an agency's treatment of
uncertainty should be consistent with the best academic practice in the
relevant fields. In Vermont Yankee, this consistency was lacking. The
general theory of decisionmaking under uncertainty calls for decisions
based on consideration of the details of social or individual preferences. In
particular, if no special assumptions are made about the distribution of
44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,363, 45,365 (1979). As Commissioner Gilinsky pointed out, id. at 45,374,
this suggestion obscures the real implications of the fuel cycle debate. No universal yardstick can
accurately measure the costs and benefits of fuel cycle activities and evaluate them in the context of
other environmental and economic considerations routinely considered in every licensing action. A
licensing board can decide whether the net benefits of reactor operation outweigh the putative costs
associated with the fuel cycle. But given the crude decision instruments at hand, to declare that the
risks of nuclear waste disposal tilt the cost-benefit balance against one reactor is also to say that no
reactor should be built or operated. See id. at 45,374 & n.1. It is naive to suppose that any NRC
hearing board would reach such a decision. Vermont Yankee III and Vermont Yankee IV are there-
fore shadow versions of the debate about the legitimacy and long-term viability of the commercial
nuclear power industry in which the courts have no institutional role.
129. Baltimore Elec. & Gas Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (1983).
130. More precisely, transuranic isotopes such as plutonium-239, a much discussed constituent of
spent reactor fuel with a half-life of 24,000 years, are known to cause lung tumors in animals, after
administration of inhaled doses as small as one microcurie. See W. BAIR, C. RICHMOND & B.
WACHHOLz, A RADIOBIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIATION DOSE
FROM INHALED PLUTONIUM, at 14 (AEC Report WASH-1320, 1974) (table III-A). One microcurie
of plutonium-239 amounts roughly to 25 millionths of a gram.
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decision outcomes or social preferences, there is no logically consistent de-
cision rule that gives uncertainties zero weight. Yet uncertainties were
given zero weight in computing the risk estimates the NRC presented in
all three versions of the fuel cycle rule at issue in the Vermont Yankee
litigation."' In responding critically to the Commission's zero-risk find-
ing, Judge Bazelon therefore restated a rationality requirement of the
most fundamental and important sort.132
Nor does Vermont Yankee IV contribute to the balance among institu-
tions essential to a healthy administrative system. The modern model of
separated and divided powers calls for constructive cooperation among the
legislature, agencies, and courts.133 Within the cooperative model, courts
are called upon to set general standards for agency behavior. But Vermont
131. See 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,372-73 (1979) (codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.20(e), 51.23(c)
(1983)) (final table S-3); 42 Fed. Reg. 13,803, 13,806-07 (1977) (interim table S-3); 39 Fed. Reg.
14,188, 14,191 (1974) (original table S-3).
132. Vermont Yankee III is best read as suggesting that NEPA requires decisionmakers to incor-
porate in their environmental statements explicit rules for relatively weighting point estimates of risk
and the associated uncertainties. In light of this interpretation, Vermont Yankee IV's rejection of
Judge Bazelon's attack on the Commission's zero-risk rule is understandable. For although his argu-
ments have merit as general propositions about the necessity for explicit treatment of environmental
uncertainties, his approach to risk analysis is analytically unconvincing. "Risk" is not an observable
entity. It is a concept that is defined by specifying a rule or reasoning process that combines observa-
ble components, such as the probability of a future event and its consequences, into a measure of risk.
Yet Judge Bazelon directly equated uncertainties in the future environmental effects of nuclear waste
disposal with "environmental costs," NRC v. NRDC, 685 F.2d 459, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Vermont
Yankee III), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983) (Vermont
Yankee IV), without displaying the risk-building rule used to effect this transformation. Nor does
Judge Bazelon make clear why he believes future fuel cycle effects must be entered on the cost side of
the ledger. While it is true that reprocessing of spent fuel is now generally seen as economically
infeasible and environmentally inadvisable, that position may change in the future with technological
developments or shifts in energy policies.
Moreover, in another part of his argument, Judge Bazelon adopted a simple, widely used approach
that equates risk with the product "probability" times "consequences," 685 F.2d at 478-79 & n.100.
Thus, he identified risk with the summary statistic "expected costs." But accepting, as Judge Bazelon
did, NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Vermont Yankee I), rev'd sub nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yankee II),
NRDC's position as to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear waste repository failures, the validity
of the simple product form of risk is open to question. The catastrophes anticipated by the environ-
mental plaintiffs in Vermont Yankee III include a destruction of community that is not captured
analytically by the simple, risk-neutral product, "probability" times "consequences." Moreover, such
catastrophes have implications for human community, see K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH:
DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976), that transcend representation
in terms of dollars spent and lives lost. See Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique,
REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33. The magnitude and interpersonal aspects of such an event sug-
gest that the appropriate social preference function exhibits risk-aversion, leading to a non-linear
dependence of risk upon putative consequences different from the simple linear product adopted by
Judge Bazelon.
133. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939) (calling for agency-court cooperation);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same in environ-
mental context); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(same); G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 42, 50 (1982) (calling for revivi-
fied court-legislature balance); Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921)
(proposing commission to mediate between agencies and courts).
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Yankee IV's impeccable logic strikes a discordant note. For rather than
taking the broad view essential for dispassionate oversight, the Court
reads the NRC's decision in isolation from past AEC and NRC actions. It
interprets the Commission's findings as a limited response to the antici-
pated performance of one disposal alternative-the placement of wastes in
bedded salt.134 And ignoring the plain words of the Commission's justifi-
cation for the final rule,135 it reads into the NRC's decision the conclusion
that the uncertainties associated with waste repository performance "are
not sufficient to affect the outcome" of individual reactor licensing ac-
tions.13 On this limited view, the Commission's decision is clearly sup-
portable. Yet the Court's narrow reasoning demonstrates that the defer-
ence model is hollow. For Vermont Yankee IV sets no standard of agency
behavior, but instead disrupts the institutional balance by reaffirming the
Court's past practice1 7 of blocking judicial oversight of nuclear power
regulation.138
In sum, the record suggests the Court has been insensitive to the impli-
cations of Vermont Yankee IV for the legitimacy of the administrative
process. This insensitivity is twofold. First, the Court has allowed its con-
cern for the vitality of one important industry to override established pro-
cedural safeguards. Absent the forthright analysis of relevant uncertain-
ties, numerical point estimates do not convey to decisionmakers and the
public any sense of the seriousness of environmental hazards.3 9 The
Court's approval of the NRC's zero-risk finding therefore conflicts with
the settled rule that an administrative record must be sufficiently complete
to permit effective review and efficient regulation, to be fair to regulatees,
and to enable the education of the public and its officials.140
134. Baltimore Elec. & Gas Co. v. NRDC, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (1983) (Vermont Yankee IV).
135. See supra note 128 (discussing rule).
136. Vermont Yankee IV, 103 S. Ct. at 2253.
137. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Vermont Yan-
kee 11); Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, 423
U.S. 12 (1975) (per curiam); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
138. See Yellin, supra note 101, at 516 & n.155. Nor has the Court consistently complied with
the deference model. Vermont Yankee IV's solicitude for agency expertise in the face of scientific
uncertainty was conspicuously absent from the Court's rejection of the benzene rule proposed by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 630-38, 652-58 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Benzene). The contrast is
particularly acute in view of the NRC's obfuscation of the uncertainties in the risks of nuclear waste
disposal and OSHA's forthright discussion of uncertainties in its estimates of the risk of cancer from
low-level exposure to airborne benzene.
139. The final rule suggests the NRC agrees with this position. See 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,362
(1979) ("effluent release values, standing alone, do not meaningfully convey the environmental signifi-
cance of uranium fuel cycle activities").
140. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981) (NEPA impact statement is intended to "inform the public that the agency has considered
environmental concerns"); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding unlaw-
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Second, the Court has failed to respond to a shift in the public's percep-
tion of the nature of environmental decisions. As biological discoveries
provide us with a deeper understanding of health risks, society's view of
the class of such risks important enough to deserve a response from gov-
ernment broadens."" In consequence, environmental decisions that once
would have been seen as purely social and technological have now taken
on the attributes of decisions affecting the personal safety and integrity of
citizens qua individual citizens. Clarity and fullness of explanation are
central to the legitimacy of decisions affecting individual health and
safety, 42 and therefore to the legitimacy of the associated decision process.
Once environmental decisions lose their pure social and technological
character and take on the attributes of decisions directly affecting impor-
tant individual interests, the same fullness of explanation becomes central
to the legitimacy of the administrative state.
143
IV.
Frankfurter's predictions have yet to be proved correct. The New
Deal's administrative state responded in a limited way to specific political
and economic problems. It did not sweep away the Blackstonian past, but
ful Interior Department's refusal to issue supplemental impact statement for offshore oil lease pro-
gram, on grounds that decision documents before Secretary of Interior "did not describe the likely
environmental harms well enough to . . . [enable] an informed decision"); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)
(Supp. V 1978) (explanation required in EPA rulemaking regarding air quality); Comment, supra
note 97, at 202 (NEPA a device for publicly describing uncertainty).
141. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, supra note 36, at 1027; RISK MGMT. REP., supra note 36, at 9-11
(noting increase in risk awareness).
142. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (duty to
warn industrial insulation workers of dangers of asbestos); Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Coun-
seling, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 619, 626 (1979) (importance of transmitting information on genetic risks);
Note, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to Know, 90 YALE L.J. 1792 (1981) (pro-
posing federal legislation requiring disclosure of health risks).
143. Sound economic reasoning also supports a requirement that technological decisions be fully
explained. Efficient, fair operation of our mixed economy demands that private parties be free, once
regulatory ground rules have been set, to act in their own best interests. They cannot do so effectively
without knowing the details of the logic underlying administrative predictions. Moreover, we expect
technological innovation in response to the need for better environmental controls. See, e.g., Society of
the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.) (OSHA regulations may require
improvements in existing occupational hazard control technology), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
Yet in the presence of technological and scientific uncertainty, efficient incentives for innovation are
not provided unless the logic relating societal means to goals is clearly laid out.
These arguments, in combination with those in the text, suggest a connection between an emergent
right to know, see Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1;
Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.
J. 235, 246-47 n.56 (1981), and the fair and efficient functioning of the modern administrative state.
The continuing reluctance of courts to impose full clarity requirements suggests the need for an
explicit statutory requirement that administrators clearly set out assumptions, explain statistical or
mathematical models, and identify gaps in technical information. For a legislative provision of this
type, see the proposed Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1080, § 4(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (proposed
5 U.S.C. § 622(c)(2)(D)).
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codified preexisting judicial and administrative relationships.' 4 It has not
met ambiguous environmental goals, but rather articulated relatively un-
ambiguous social and economic objectives. During the past forty years, the
New Deal state has been severely tested. Ethyl, Reserve Mining, Vermont
Yankee, and the other cases discussed above 4 ' represent a sample of some
eighty major technical and legal decisions 46 that have run the course from
legislative enactment to judicial review. These decisions were stimulated
by discovery and innovation and are replete with mixtures of the technical
and the political. Their histories make the need for institutional redesign
clear. The traditional model of administrative law,' 47 freighted with pri-
vate law conceptions' 48 and outmoded functional distinctions between
agencies and courtg, 149 and limited by institutional competence 50 and
finite judicial and administrative resources, simply cannot bear the weight
we ask it to carry.
No viable reforms can shield generalist political institutions from scien-
tific and technological complexity. Yet despite the interplay of the techni-
cal and political, with some notable exceptions' judicial reluctance to
address technical issues remains strong.' 5 2 This reluctance is manifest in
144. For a pre-APA comment emphasizing the consistency with past practices of the then-
emergent APA review provisions, see Fuller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 589, 604-05 (1941).
145. See supra pp. 1315-16.
146. The work reported on in this Article is part of a larger ongoing study of environmental
controversies, tentatively entitled "The Courts and Scientific Decisions." Analysis of 80 major cases
reported reported between 1960 and 1983 reveals a gradual shift to more complex issues and toward
deeper judicial involvement in technical matters. This observation motivates many of the arguments in
this Article. Professor Rabin has summarized the results of a parallel analysis at this Symposium. See
Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept of Rights, 92 YALE L.J. 1174 (1983).
147. See Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARv. L. REV. 430 (1917);
Stewart, supra note 9, at 1671-76.
148. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281,
1282-83 (1976).
149. See Stewart, supra note 103, at 1811-20. But see Byse, supra note 103, at 1831-32 (demand
for judicial imposition of procedural requirements on agency action reveals lack of trust in political
process).
150. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (errone-
ously asserting that failure of emergency core cooling system in commercial reactor is necessary condi-
tion for occurrence of large-scale accident); id. at 1089-90 (erroneously deducing from AEC staff
report that reactor site selection criteria are based upon occurrence of largest feasible accident); Re-
serve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (noting "level of probability
does not readily convert into a prediction of consequences"); supra note 132. The lack of institutional
competence in the judiciary to deal with complex decisions, see J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
193 (1983), was a New Deal theme. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 596, 597, 599-600; Fuchs,
supra note 3, at 562.
151. See supra pp. 1313-16.
152. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 541-42 (1978)
(Vermont Yankee II) (reading lower court's mixed procedural and substantive holding as purely
procedural); Greater N.Y. Hosp. Ass'n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1976) (technical
issues "simply not subject to judicial evaluation"); Wuillamey v. Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237, 241
(D.N.J. 1973) (technical expertise needed to reach air quality finding renders agency decision unas-
sailable in court).
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the model of deference to policymaking on the frontiers of science and
technology.15 When technical aspects of public decisions are isolated from
the mainstream of generalist institutional discussion, it is difficult to over-
come the bureaucratic inertia that is universal to the modern administra-
tive state15' and especially virulent in environmental regulation. 55 In the-
ory, court and legislature can break the inertial pattern by writing pointed
legislation and by assuring that judicial oversight is sensitive to the full
sweep of an agency's history. Yet in those instances in which technological
issues are complex and agencies have grown sufficiently sophisticated to
give the system of congressional mandate, administrative decision, and ju-
dicial review a real test, the results have not been encouraging. The
Court's narrowly drawn argument in Vermont Yankee IV""' provides
only the most recent evidence that the presence of high technology en-
hances inertial effects by insulating administrative decisions from legisla-
tive and judicial oversight.
Study of the major environmental cases of the past two decades
57 sug-
gests that any viable institutional reforms should have five features: (1)
For the legal, economic, and normative reasons already discussed, 58 re-
forms must induce environmental decisionmakers to explain their predic-
tions and reveal the value choices that inevitably underlie decisions made
in the face of scientific uncertainty; 59 (2) in order to avoid the taint of
special interest, institutional innovation should be directed toward break-
ing the inertial pattern on a broad environmental front, from occupational
health to nuclear power; (3) to build a reserve of experienced deci-
sionmakers, an array of continuing, rather than ad hoc, institutions is re-
quired; (4) given the importance of institutional competence in confronting
153. See supra pp. 1320, 1323.
154. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 133, at 46, 53-54, 65, 72; Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond
the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1520 & n.216 (1980).
155. These inertial effects account for the freezing of the technology for controlling sulfur emis-
sions from conventional steam-electric power plants. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 154, at
1466, 1520-21. Inertial effects are also apparent in the inflexible OSHA guidelines for dealing with
the risks of exposure to putative carcinogens. See RISK MGMT. REP., supra note 36, at 64-65 (discuss-
ing 29 C.F.R. § 1990.144(e) (1983)). With bureaucratic inertia in mind, some courts have enjoined
agency action pending preparation of an adequate NEPA statement. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt,
716 F.2d 946, 951-53 (1st Cir. 1983) (offshore oil lease sale); NRDC v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 842 (2d
Cir. 1976) (use of recycled plutonium in commercial nuclear reactors), vacated and remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Serv. v. NRC, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978); see also W. RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 767 (1977) (NEPA requires "consideration of environmental factors before
project momentum is irresistible").
156. See supra pp. 1322-23.
157. See supra p. 1325.
158. See supra pp. 1323-24.
159. Cf EPA Office of Public Affairs, News Release, July 12, 1983 (EPA Administrator offers to
allow population of Tacoma, Wash., to participate in decision whether to close smelting operation
emitting inorganic arsenic, under provisions of Clean Air Act).
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difficult substantive questions, and therefore in achieving legitimacy,'
technical communities should directly participate in decisionmaking; and
(5) to be clearly perceived as legitimate and avoid interference with ordi-
nary constitutional functions, the power of any new institution should
flow from its personnel and the persuasiveness of its arguments, not from
the direct delegation of authority.
With these requirements in mind, I have three suggestions. First, I pro-
pose the creation of a hybrid institution combining executive and legisla-
tive branch decisionmakers"' with experts from outside government.
Under this proposal, the President would appoint a commission that
would include the chairmen of the Council for Environmental Quality
and the Council of Economic Advisors, the president of the National
Academy of Sciences, the Attorney General, and selected members of Con-
gress. The commission would also include rotating representatives from
the biological, physical science, and engineering communities. The agency
heads concerned would sit as ad hoc commission members. This commis-
sion would be charged with a scheduled review of environmental pro-
grams and would give special attention to areas in which scientific knowl-
edge and technical data are incomplete. It would recommend large-scale
policy choices and programs for future actions contingent on the results of
ongoing research. 62 It would formulate proposals for updating environ-
mental statutes and transmit these proposals to the relevant congressional
committees. The commission's enabling legislation would include proce-
dures to assure floor consideration of its proposals during the year in
which they are presented to Congress.6
3
This proposal does not shift the burden of inertia"6 or force Congress'
hand. Yet it is likely to provoke constructive action. The commissioners
will be adept at addressing both political and technical problems. They
will be insulated from the immediate pressures of policymaking and can
160. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 38 (1979).
161. But cf G. CALABRESI, supra note 133, at 63 (arguing that hybrid executive-legislative com-
mission for updating statutes would either exercise unchecked executive power or take on responsibili-
ties properly belonging to courts).
162. Cf. RISK MGMT. REP., supra note 36, at 81 (calling for risk assessment guidelines that can
accommodate evolving scientific knowledge).
163. The updating and congressional reporting features of this proposal are modeled in part on
sunset legislation proposed in 1979 by Senator Kennedy. See S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 366-67
(discussing S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)). The suggestion for a hybrid commission is moti-
vated by the success of the Warren Commission, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY (1964); the Kerner Commission, REPORT OF THE NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); the Social Security Commission, Report of the Nat'l
Comm'n on Social Security Reform, 46 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3 (1983); and the Scowcroft Commis-
sion, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON STRATEGIC FORCES (1983) (MX missile system).
164. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 133, at 60, 65.
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avoid the pitfalls of long-term decisionmaking driven solely by crisis.18 '
Second, I propose creating surrogates for democratic representation
within the regulatory agencies. The Separatists' conclusions may be incor-
rect, 68 but they do us a service by pointing out that in the absence of
practical distinctions between the technical and the political, nothing pre-
vents administrators from using their discretion gradually to draw politi-
cal decisions under the cloak of expertise, effectively precluding public
participation in environmental decisions. 167 A surrogate for democratic
decisionmaking can be constructed by taking advantage of the contrast in
styles and intellectual approaches among the technical disciplines.168 One
attractive alternative is to use two different planning groups within each
agency, one based intellectually in economics, the other in biology. 69 Ex-
perience suggests that the economic planners will attempt to minimize the
quantifiable costs of proposed regulations 170 through the use of price in-
centives. 17 1 In contrast, the biological planners will tend to emphasize ex-
trapolation to man from the results of in vitro toxicity experiments,
animal models, or known effects of chemicals and radiation in simple or-
165. See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 263-74, 299-300 (1977) (discussing
role of pollution crises in generating widespread-though often adventitious and evanescent-public
support for environmental controls).
166. See supra p. 1307.
167. See supra pp. 1317-18.
168. The analytic power of interdisciplinary professional debate is revealed, for example, in the
quality of the debates between earth scientists and physicists over the applicability of easily manipula-
ble models in dealing with the intricacies of long-term ground transport of nuclear wastes, see U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE OF GEOLOGIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING POTENTIAL
TRANSPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM DEEP CONTINENTAL DEPOSITORIES 29-30
(1978) (report 520/4-78-004) (report of ad hoc panel of earth scientists), and in the debate between
soil and atmospheric scientists over the relative role and significance of atmospheric and soil chemistry
in mediating the effects of acid rain, see Krug & Frink, Acid Rain on Acid Soil: A New Perspective,
221 SCIENCE 520 (1983).
The energy of the clash between biological and physical science research philosophies could have
profitably been called upon at different stages in the nuclear safety debate by including biologists in
discussions otherwise reserved for physicists and engineers. In response to continuing debate about the
reliability of the methodology and arguments used by the NRC in assessing the risks of nuclear
power, the Commssion created an ad hoc review group. See AD HOG RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW
GROUP, REPORT TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1978) (NRC Consultant's Re-
port NUREG/CR-0400). Although much of the required analysis concerned the health effects of
exposure to ionizing radiation, no biologists participated. Thus, the NRC did not take advantage of
the advice of researchers with a commitment to understanding diverse living systems through labora-
tory analysis, rather than achieving the physical scientist's ultimate goal of simplicity and depth of
theoretical understanding. Cf. Remarks of Howard Temin, in THE JOYS OF RESEARCH 79, 80-81 (W.
Shropshire ed. 1981) (discussing Gamow, Information Transfer in the Living Cell, SC. AM., Oct.
1955, at 70, as example of irrelevance of pure theory to progress in molecular biology).
169. Each agency and area of regulation poses its own distinctive problems that deserve an indi-
vidualized institutional response. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 771, 787-88 (1975); Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in
Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 120 (1977).
170. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 12, 28, 29 (1975).
171. See, e.g., id. at 105-07; J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 165, at 35-36, 301-04.
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ganisms,1 72 and exhibit a countervailing preference for health-based stan-
dards and direct regulation. Under this proposal, the two planning groups
would report independently on identical policy questions formulated by
the agency head. Agencies could then regulate in light of two alternative
sets of findings that would be part of the public record. The quality of
ultimate decisions, in light of comments from the technical and social sci-
ence communities and the results of judicial review, should make the bur-
dens and benefits of this experiment clear.
This suggestion moves the administrative process away from the cen-
tralized models for regulatory reform that have frequently been pro-
posed. 17 3 The rationale for centralized regulation is increased efficiency,
stability, and predictability of decisions. One can argue that competition
breeds instability; that a public clash of views detracts from the legitimacy
of decisions; 17 4 that duplication creates conflict that inevitably leads to in-
ferior decisions shaped by advocacy, bargaining, and compromise, rather
than by substance; and therefore that the resulting administrative process
would be unable to respond to discovery and innovation. I am persuaded,
however, that innovations of this kind can increase flexibility and speed
decisionmaking by encouraging an earlier, more open debate over the sub-
stance of technological decisions within the agencies, rather than in the
White House, Congress, and the courts. The costs of internalizing dis-
172. See, e.g., McCann & Ames, The Salmonella/Microsome Mutagenicity Test: Predictive
Value for Animal Carcinogenicity, in ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER: BOOK C, HUMAN RISK ASSESS-
MENT 1431, 1446-47 (T. Hiatt, J. Watson & J. Winsten eds. 1977) (arguing on basis of mutagenicity
experiments on Salmonella bacteria and other evidence that industrial chemicals cause somatic muta-
tions in cellular DNA, and that Salmonella/microsome test provides precise and rapid in vitro method
for identifying environmental mutagens and minimizing human exposure); Popper, Selikoff, Maltoni,
Squire & Thomas, Comparison of Neoplastic Hepatic Lesions in Man and Experimental Animals, in
id. at 1359 (comparing etiology of liver tumors in man and rodents, and concluding observed similari-
ties support extrapolation from animals to man). Of course, attitudes toward environmental regulation
within biology and economics differ, and personnel choices must insure that an agency has a roughly
balanced pair of planning views.
The proposal does not rely upon modification of the existing advisory system. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 656
(1976) (National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health); 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976)
(NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards); 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (1983) (standing FDA advi-
sory committees). When constituted without regard to the institutional affiliations of prospective mem-
bers, advisory committees are often useful in bringing a deeper perspective to an agency's technical
analysis. But they can also lead to nonconstructive posturing and confrontation. Compare T. Green-
wood, Knowledge and Discretion in Regulation 173-74 (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with
Yale Law Journal) (narrowly focused EPA Science Advisory Board deliberations have improved
agency risk assessments, helped identify and sometimes resolve controversies, correct technical errors)
with id. at 174 (statutory instruction to constitute OSHA advisory committees with balance of em-
ployer and employee viewpoints provided little more than forum for contention and only rarely helped
agency in risk assessment or engineering analyses of regulatory options). The emphasis here is upon
institutional reforms that integrate dissonant professional views within an agency.
173. E.g., COMM'N ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 79-88; Cutler, supra note 27,
at 553; Cutler & Johnson, supra note 27, at 1414-17. See generally S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 359-
60 (describing proposals to give President veto power over administrative action).
174. Cf Ruckelshaus, supra note 36, at 1028 (public interest not served when federal agencies
openly disagree on hazards of same substance).
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agreements within agencies may well be outweighed by the benefits of a
multi-disciplinary approach that encourages more open choices among di-
verse values, and revitalizes representative government.
17 5
Finally, a review of the last two environmental decades suggests that
our nineteenth-century system of judicial oversight needs help if it is to
deal competently with the problems of twentieth-century technological so-
ciety." A science advisory body for the federal judiciary could provide
that help. Elsewhere, I have suggested one model, in which an advisory
group of standing masters is associated with the federal appellate
courts. 7 This proposal seeks to encourage a critical, continuing dialogue
between the scientific and engineering communities and the courts. Judges
could call upon the masters in complex cases presenting issues on the
frontiers of research and innovation. I conceive of a two-stage proceeding.
The first stage would focus, consistent with present master's practices,178
on technical questions proposed by the court. In the second stage, the mas-
ters would examine the appellate record in the context of the whole case,
giving thought to open scientific questions, discussing these questions in-
formally with appropriate members of the technical community, and re-
porting to the court on the implications of their studies for future
litigation.' 79
175. The value of overlapping institutional responsibilities and of intra-organizational competition
are also themes of the literature on organizations. See Landau, Redundancy, Rationality and the
Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969); Sapolsky, Solution to the
"Health Crisis," 3 POL'Y ANALYSIS 115, 118, 121 (1977); Sapolsky, Organizational Competition and
Monopoly, 17 PUB. POL'Y 355, 376 (1968).
176. See cases cited supra note 150. That the courts would benefit from scientific advice is not a
new idea. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand,
J.) (need for expert chemist to examine evidence in adrenalin patents litigation).
177. See Yellin, supra note 101, at 555-59; c. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 308 n.31 (5th Cir.
1974) (scale of court's effort needed to understand model for regional air pollution suggests that ap-
pointment of special master would have been desirable), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976). Other
writers have made similar proposals for the use of masters and magistrates, see Note, The Environ-
mental Court Proposal: Requiem, Analysis, and Counterproposal, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 676, 692-96
(1975), and for special science advisors to the judiciary, see Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next
Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1976).
178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b) (permitting reference to master in jury cases when issues are
complex, and in nonjury cases only when required by "exceptional condition").
179. But see Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 135, 152 (1981) (rejecting masters' proposal on ground it derogates adversary system).
Judge Wald's article and this one begin from common ground. She points out that lawyers often stress
doctrinal rather than real-life arguments, and that sometimes a client's interests will not be promoted
by addressing and uncovering the full ramifications of a case. Id. at 147. Therefore the adversary
process structured and directed by the parties often cannot help judges to reach a full understanding of
an agency record.
Judge Wald suggests allowing courts to reconvene the parties after oral argument, with experts
included, for an informal interrogatory. This would occur after the writer of an opinion had been
chosen and the court had identified ambiguities or inconsistencies in a long and complex record. She
suggests that courts follow Judge Leventhal's lead in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068,
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and allow the parties to comment on a "proposed opinion."
In making this proposal, Judge Wald suggests that courts can function in much the same fashion as
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Some may prefer that the courts sharply limit their role in environmen-
tal controversies, 8 ° effectively withdrawing from technological decision-
making, but that is not a realistic prospect. Cases that inextricably mix
the legal and technical will continue to test the judicial system. Generalist
judges will continue to define government's responsibilities in adjusting to
technological change and to strike a balance between the use of new tech-
nology and the preservation of otherwise immutable values.1 81 Moreover,
the demise of the legislative veto 82 can only intensify the pressures on
Congress to revert to practices of an earlier era'1 3 and give detailed envi-
ronmental instructions it could otherwise have left unspecified,'M ulti-
mately drawing the courts deeper into reviewing the substance of environ-
mental decisions.
We should have no qualms about the modest changes in the scope of
the judicial role that these proposals entail. There is no evidence that
judges, given the opportunity, can or will take control over environmental
policy. Indeed, their reluctance to do so is manifest.18 5 Nor is it likely that
judges will allow expert advisors to exercise judicial power.
The introduction of informal procedures into the appellate process will
the masters' committee suggested in this Article. Her suggestion is a good one. It should be tried in a
variety of technical cases. It is an open question, however, whether major improvements of decisions
are likely without investments in time beyond what is practical for appellate judges. But see Wald,
supra, at 153-54 (stressing likelihood of net saving of judicial time).
180. See Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1978).
181. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2496
(1983) (striking down municipal statute requiring all second-trimester abortions to be performed in
hospital, in view of excellent outpatient care now available). Even more difficult issues are emerging.
See Fetal Research, New Field Offers Promise Amid Problems, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at C1, col.
5 (use of tissues from aborted fetuses for treatment of disease).
182. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
183. See, e.g., Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 7, 5 Stat. 304, 305 (master of steamboat required to
open boiler safety valve whenever vessel docks); id. § 9, 5 Stat. at 306 (iron rods and chain to be used
in steamboat navigation, rather than wheel or tiller ropes).
184. Ten of 56 selected current statutory provisions authorizing a legislative veto, see INS v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2811-16 (1983) (White, J., dissenting), and therefore presumptively invali-
dated by Chadha, deal with important environmental concerns. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1713(c), 1714
(West Supp. 1983) (sale of public lands may be disapproved by concurrent resolution); Pub. L. No.
96-539, § 4, 94 Stat. 3194, 3195 (1980) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136w) (EPA regulations under
FIFRA); Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 305, 94 Stat. 2767, 2809 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9655)
(regulations concerning release of hazardous substances); 10 U.S.C. § 7422(c)(2)(C) (1976) (produc-
tion period for petroleum reserves); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2406(d)(2)(B), 2406(g)(3) (Supp. V 1981)
(domestic crude oil production); Pub. L. No. 96-464, § 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067 (1980) (to be codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1463a) (regulations governing coastal zone management); 16 U.S.C. § 1432 (1982)
(designation of marine sanctuaries); Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 126, 128, 129, 94 Stat. 611, 644-49, 650-
54 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8722, 8724, 8725) (comprehensive plan for synthetic fuels
development); 42 U.S.C. § 5919(m) (Supp. V 1981) (international agreements concerning storage of
spent nuclear fuel); 42 U.S.C. § 6421(c) (1976) (presidential orders with respect to energy conserva-
tion and pricing).
185. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-37 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
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restrict the rights and protections guaranteed by the formal adversary sys-
tem. Yet making environmental decisionmaking less formal is not neces-
sarily undesirable. That the traditional party-controlled process is used for
environmental decisionmaking, despite the restrictions imposed by jus-
ticiability, is less evidence of concern for individual rights than recognition
of the seriousness of the issues. In effect, we have used the adversary sys-
tem to make environmental decisions as an experiment in ways to make
wiser long-term choices. The adversary system is not, however, an essen-
tial source of legitimacy for technological decisions. On the contrary, in
technical controversies, scathing superficial questioning by counsel intent
on winning a case increases skepticism about the usefulness and legiti-
macy of the formal adversary process and discourages expert participa-
tion.188 Moreover, while party control of legal controversies induces law-
yers' support for the judicial system, legitimacy does not flow from a
process in which important environmental decisions are shaped by lawyers
whose training, predilections, and skills are not attuned to the issues of
central importance. Nor is legitimacy enhanced when simplistic analyses
of complex environmental problems187 or encyclopedic treatment of pe-
ripheral issues 88 are encouraged. When sophisticated technical language
and art play central roles in the substance of decision, when more is
needed than simple judgments of whether policy analysts have considered
all important factors,"" or when decisions turn on deductions from com-
plex models,190 substance-independent adversary techniques at best give
the imprimatur, not the reality, of independent oversight. 91 The essential
task is to enable a form of judicial review that can maintain a balance
among law-enforcing, law-interpreting, and law-making institutions. In
an era of discovery and innovation, achieving such a balance demands the
thorough integration of scientific judgment into the judicial process.
Resolution of the antinomy 92 between independent judicial review and
186. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1285 n.92 (1975) (expert
participation discouraged by prospect of hectoring cross-examination).
187. See McGarity, supra note 25, at 750, 777; Wald, supra note 179, at 147; Yellin, supra note
101, at 505-08, 529-31, 546-48.
188. See Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir.) (criticizing
"blunderbuss" approach to environmental litigation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
189. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per
curiam); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Yellin, supra note 101, at 545 & n.337.
190. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (econometric model
of public utility behavior in response to coal price differentials and to variable EPA standards for use
of coal with varying sulfur content); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1160
(6th Cir.) (model of atmospheric dispersion of sulfur emissions from coal-fired power plant), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294-96 (5th Cir. 1974) (reduction model
for hydrocarbon emissions), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976).
191. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
192. Cf NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.) (recognition
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reliance on the best scientific judgment is not imminent. It will require
nurturing generalist decisionmakers' understanding of new developments
in science and technology. The goal is to assure that decisionmakers can
respond flexibly and constructively to swiftly changing regulatory
problems.' While institutional reforms may resolve the crises of legiti-
macy and competence that now confront the administrative state,' there
are more important concerns. Our survival as a functioning nation
through the end of this century depends on our reasonableness in making
technological decisions. We serve ourselves by making a commitment
throughout our educational system and government to exposing the real
complexities of these decisions.
of administrative expertise "involves an abdication by the 'lay' courts"; no general principle solves the
"antinomy of their retaining any review whatever"), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
193. See RISK MGMT. REP., supra note 36, at 78-79, 165.
194. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 10-12 (1978).
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